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This practico-material inertia of the real presupposes the excep-
tional moment, the Blitz of reason, the Jetzt of the moment of rup-
ture. I see this as an internalization of Leninism … Along with this 
comes an aristocratic attitude and a definition of the intellectual 
as one who is capable of voluntaristically pointing the way, as a 
Nietzschean intellectual capable of breaking through by force of 
will.
Alice Jardine and Brian Massumi, “Interview with Toni Negri,” 
(1988)1
PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS
I want to thank Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen for his thoughtful remarks 
on socially engaged art criticism, my own research, and FIELD. I 
especially appreciate his willingness to share his observations with 
me in advance, and to allow me the opportunity to respond. He 
also generously provided me with some of his other recent essays, 
which I will respond to in part below. This exchange has allowed 
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me to return to issues I have addressed in the past and elaborate on 
them with a deeper, and hopefully more nuanced, understanding. 
It also touches directly on questions that are central to my current 
research. Since many of the points that Rasmussen raises in his es-
say reiterate criticisms that have been made by other writers dur-
ing the past few years I will use his essay as a jumping off point 
for some broader remarks on the analysis of socially engaged art 
(SEA). To that extent I will take his comments as representing a 
problématique, as Althusser would say. That is, I see them as fram-
ing a particular constellation of issues in a way that reveals some 
of the constraints of existing paradigms in contemporary art the-
ory more generally. In this manner I hope to justify, or at least ex-
cuse, the lengthiness of my response. Before turning to the more 
substantive questions that Rasmussen raises I will briefly address 
some issues that may be based on simple misunderstandings or in 
response to which the reader can be referred to other works. In his 
essay Rasmussen make the following claims:
One of the problems with Kester’s new socially engaged art crit-
icism, which mimics to a large extent the practice of socially en-
gaged art, is its reliance on an adjusted Habermasian notion of 
communication in which dialogue leads to empathy and recog-
nition (of the other). The critic should not focus primarily on 
the formal aspects of an artwork but, instead, report with em-
pathy and evaluate socially engaged art’s ability to listen to the 
context and the audience. It is about establishing an “empathet-
ic identification” between artists and their collaborators. There 
is a problematic privileging of consensus and inter-subjectivity 
here that tends to recoil from more radical or ‘unreasonable’ de-
mands that are less interested in establishing a dialogue or em-
pathy than in making visible processes of exclusion and lines of 
fracture that do not disappear because the artist (and the critic) 
have good intentions and wish to mobilize a local community.
There are two, related, points to respond to here.2 Rasmussen’s 
contention that I privilege consensus over criticality or dissen-
sus, is one that I have responded to on several occasions over the 
last few years. Rather than review all of these responses in de-
tail I would simply direct the reader to my discussions of the is-
sue of consensus (and the discourse of “reform” and “revolution”) 
in chapters one and three of The One and the Many, as well as in 
“The Sound of Breaking Glass” (E-flux journal, #30, December 
2011 and #31, January 2012), “The Device Laid Bare: On Some 
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Limitations in Current Art Criticism” (E-flux journal #50, 2013) 
and “On the Relationship Between Theory and Practice in Socially 
Engaged Art” (A Blade of Grass website, July 2015). At the meth-
odological level the problem stems from the tendency of critics 
to project a synchronic model of analysis (in which a given work 
is conceived of as either consensual or dissensual) on to projects 
that are diachronic in nature, and which often involve a series of 
movements through phases of both conciliation and contention or 
disagreement. The interactions between Tania Bruguera, Cuban 
authorities and a broader public that unfolded following the can-
cellation of her 2014 Tatlin’s Whisper 6 performance in Havana’s 
Plaza de la Revolución (#YoTambiénExijo) are exemplary in this 
regard. I would also note here that my interest in artistic practices 
that incorporate provisional forms of consensus in my first book, 
Conversation Pieces, emerged in response to a tendency in contem-
porary art theory to valorize an often crudely defined concept of 
dissensus and negation. This is a critique that I first developed in 
my “Rhetorical Questions” essay (Afterimage, January 1993). 
A related difficulty, from my perspective, is that this approach 
ignores the key differential in some SEA projects between the 
modes of inter-subjective exchange that occur among a given set 
of collaborators in developing a gesture or work, and the relation-
ship of that work to a specific site of practical resistance. A con-
crete example might make this point clearer. The Lava la Bandera 
project, produced in Peru during the late 1990s and early 2000s, be-
gan when a small group of artists and activists staged a ritual wash-
ing of the Peruvian flag in the Plaza Mayor in central Lima. They 
intended this as a protest against the corruption of the Fujimori 
regime. The gesture, unexpectedly, spread quite rapidly, and was 
soon being repeated in plazas throughout the country (not without 
risk, since the police would often attempt to prevent this perfor-
mance from taking place). The “viral” proliferation of this gesture 
catalyzed a sense of solidarity, resistance, and shared agency in the 
Peruvian public that contributed to Fujimori’s downfall and remov-
al from office. The solidarity, and empathy, that unfolded among 
the participants in the washing action was integral to the realization 
of a very “unreasonable” (or at least unrealistic) demand. Moreover, 
the simple gesture of washing the flag was recognized, quite cor-
rectly, by the Fujimori regime as a direct assault on its legitima-
cy (hence their deployment of the police and military to block it).3 
The second problem with Rasmussen’s formulation is the as-
sumption that one can simply “make visible processes of exclu-
sion,” thereby catalyzing a “radical” demand of some kind. This 
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Colectivo Sociedad Civil, Lava la Bandera,  
Plaza Mayor, Quito, Ecuador (2000)
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optical paradigm assumes the self-evidence of class repression (if 
only people knew of – or could be made aware of – their repression, 
or that of others, they would be compelled to act). But of course 
we know about all kinds of suffering, oppression, and exclusion 
and often do nothing. We have a century or more of art, as well as 
social documentary photography and film, that has dedicated it-
self to revealing ostensibly repressed or forbidden truths about the 
nature of social and political oppression (the same could be said 
about theoretical texts that “expose” the violence of neo-liberal 
capitalism). Moreover, this act of pseudo-revelation (the viewer of-
ten knows the truth to be revealed in advance) is a standard feature 
of contemporary art, evident most clearly in Santiago Sierra’s in-
stallations which ostensibly force the reluctant art world viewer to 
acknowledge their own complicity in the system of global domina-
tion through the performative reiteration of its violence (while sell-
ing artifacts of that re-enactment for tens of thousands of dollars 
to the system’s primary beneficiaries). This, of course, is the nec-
essary corollary to a reductive opposition between projects that are 
purely disruptive and those that are naively consensual. The mo-
dalities of disruption we typically encounter in the arts have long 
ago succumbed to a kind of repressive re-sublimation in which 
the ostensibly audacious attack on the viewer’s consciousness be-
comes simply another occasion for aesthetic delectation and prof-
it maximization. What we require is a far more nuanced account 
of both consensus and dissensus as experiential modes in contem-
porary art and political resistance. I am hopeful that we can agree 
that the psychic and emotional economy behind the gesture of un-
veiling or revealing suffering and exclusion is complex, and of-
ten contradictory. I agree with Rasmussen that there is a persistent 
need to expose the various forms of repression that characterize 
the neo-liberal order today, but I believe it is a mistake to detach 
this gesture from the modes of solidarity formation, critique and 
resistant practice that are necessary to catalyze change (one thinks 
here of the Escraches of H.I.J.O.S and Grupo Etc. in Argentina dur-
ing the late 1990s).4 I will address two other minor questions in the 
form of an endnote here.5
THE EXCULPATORY CRITIQUE
The second, and more productive, set of questions that Rasmussen 
raises address issues of autonomy, activism and social change. 
Rasmussen’s primary critique, as I understand it, is that SEA (at least 
as it is presented in my own research) is politically naïve and even 
threatens to block or retard the emergence of a more authentically 
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revolutionary form of cultural activism. Before pursuing this anal-
ysis further I want to make an initial conceptual clarification, re-
lated to Rasmussen’s concept of SEA as based on little more than 
“modest proposals … in which art has become a kind of socially re-
paratory activity that addresses very specific problems and tries to 
highlight or solve them.”6 It would appear that the “modesty” that 
concerns Rasmussen is related to the scalar or spatial nature of a 
given practice (“addressing very specific” or local problems). But 
surely all forms of resistance begin at the local level, even as they 
also require a global awareness. I suspect what Rasmussen desires 
is a project that “immodestly” proclaims its revolutionary intention 
and overtly criticizes capitalism. Here the absence of an existing 
revolutionary movement (which could operate at the global rather 
than the local or regional scale) is compensated for at the discur-
sive level by various rhetorical gestures (art projects that call for the 
downfall of capitalism or “make radical demands,” etc.). I would 
argue, however, that these rhetorical gestures can themselves be 
viewed as “modest” at the level of social or political generativity 
(and are easily enough co-opted or ignored). 
The challenge that Rasmussen confronts in this criticism aris-
es from the degree of imprecision he introduces between rhetorical 
effect (the concept of art as primarily the expressive enunciation of 
an a priori political position or demand that operates at the level 
of semblance) and art that is developed through the reciprocal test-
ing of political norms and boundaries through situational action. 
Thus, a gesture can easily enough be locally-scaled (and therefore 
“modest” or limited at the spatial level) but also tied to incipient or 
openly manifest forms of political opposition that are anti-capital-
ist in orientation. At the same time, there are any number of “mod-
est” gestures in recent “social art practice” that are locally-scaled 
while also trafficking in de-politicized forms of conviviality that 
are highly problematic. Rasmussen’s critique gives us no way to 
distinguish between these two modalities of practice. The problem 
with the second variant, of course, is the assumption that one can 
“solve” problems that are clearly structural or systematic in nature, 
rather than viewing engagement with them as the starting point for 
broader forms of resistance. It is also necessary here to understand 
the tactical distinction between the modes of pragmatic and rhe-
torical action that emerge in projects produced in conjunction with 
organized social movements or collectivities (what I term “politi-
cally coherent communities” in Conversation Pieces) and those that 
rely on more conventional forms of aesthetic autonomy (the work 
of Sierra, Thomas Hirschhorn, etc.). 
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Rasmussen frames his analysis in terms of art’s “dual” function. 
By art’s “dual nature” I believe he is referring to the complex set of 
ideas that circulate around the perceived autonomy of art and aes-
thetic experience in the modern period. In this context art functions 
as both a prefigurative anticipation of a new, non-coercive form of 
society (Kant’s sensus communis, Hegel’s aesthetic state and, in the 
Marxist tradition, the period of perfect social harmony that will 
follow the Dictatorship of the Proletariat). Rasmussen’s explication 
of this history takes the following form.
From German Romanticism through Critical Theory and on-
wards toward the Situationists, we have different attempts to de-
scribe this ambiguity. Two of them will have to suffice here: In 
the 1930s, Herbert Marcuse wrote about the “affirmative char-
acter of culture,” that the artwork shows an image of a different 
world but simultaneously confirms this world and, thus, func-
tions as a ‘safety valve’; in the late 1960s, Mario Perniola de-
scribed art as the only permitted form of creativity in capitalist 
society, a limited and separate form of creativity and freedom 
without practical consequences.
Rasmussen then accuses me of ignoring or denying the implicit-
ly compromised or complicit nature of art (the second half of its 
“dual nature”).
Kester seems uninterested in this duality, which has to do with 
art’s institutional status. It is almost as if Kester believes that by 
physically moving outside the traditional spaces of art, socially 
engaged art also escapes the conceptual space of its institutions 
or, at least, that there is some kind of qualitative transformation 
taking place for which the critical field analysis must account.
I would begin by noting that I have never stated that SEA projects 
somehow elude compromise or complicity simply by virtue of be-
ing staged outside of conventional art spaces. In fact, I have devot-
ed a considerable amount of time in my past research to addressing 
precisely these forms of complicity.7 I simply argue that the com-
promises involved in SEA are often of a different order, depend-
ing on the institutional and discursive frame within which the work 
operates. What I would want to challenge here, though, is the un-
derlying assumption that any practice can remain entirely pure and 
politically uncorrupted, and that the failure to do so effectively de-
stroys its transformative potential in its entirety. I think there is a 
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rigidity in this expectation that can blind us to the actual nature of 
political change, and the possibility of new forms of creative resist-
ance that may challenge our a priori assumptions.
Some further clarification may also be in order. It is helpful to 
recall that Marcuse, in his critique of the “affirmative” quality of art 
(that is, its tendency to offer an escape from capitalist repression 
rather than challenging it directly) was talking specifically about 
art practices that set themselves entirely apart from “the everyday 
world” to become an object of “spiritual contemplation.” The sit-
uation is somewhat different with SEA projects that seek to chal-
lenge this mode of absolute autonomy by engaging directly with 
forms of social or political resistance (involving what I would term 
a situational model of autonomy). Further, Rasmussen’s analysis of 
art as a utopian “safety valve” misses the key shift that takes place 
between original models of aesthetic experience based on a re-
demptive (and contemplative) notion of beauty, and the avant-gar-
de traditions of the early twentieth century, that will challenge the 
idea of beauty as yet another instance of the “premature” claim 
that the freedom promised by aesthetic experience has been uni-
versalized.8 In response, avant-garde discourse will simply invert 
the paradigm of beauty as a prefigurative experience of the recon-
ciliation of self and other, and instead devote itself to strategies 
intended to prevent this premature reconciliation, by punishing, 
assaulting or disrupting the viewer to remind them of their class 
specificity, rather than offering them a spurious class transcend-
ence (what Adorno terms art’s “admixture of poison” in Aesthetic 
Theory).9 Here the insurrectional energies of the working class and 
the violence of an always-deferred revolution are projected into the 
oppositional schema of the avant-garde artwork in its relationship 
to a hypothetical (always bourgeois) viewer. This discourse also 
provides the template for Rasmussen’s concept of an art of “unrea-
sonable demands” and, not coincidentally, for the valorization of 
an arrested form of negation as the primary modality of critical 
and creative intelligence which, as we will see below, is central to 
Rasmussen’s identity as a critic and theorist.
Given these historical shifts I believe the more precise way to frame 
this critique would take the following form:
•  SEA can be co-opted by the capitalist system by convincing us 
that real change can be produced by “modest gestures” of situ-
ational or local social change.
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•  The “state” (variously the “bourgeois,” “capitalist,” or “liber-
al democratic state”) can point to these modest changes as ev-
idence that it is capable of changing, and validate its refusal to 
engage in a more systematic transformation. 
•  The result is to further repress, derail or defuse an authentic 
revolutionary ethos which might otherwise be more likely to 
emerge.
This is, of course, a relatively familiar criticism. I address it in the 
“Theory and Practice” essay, referenced above, where I define it as 
an “exculpatory critique”. As noted above, I am entirely sympathet-
ic with this set of concerns. However, as I have also observed, this 
critique is necessary but not sufficient. It can, if elaborated within 
an excessively mechanistic model of political change, become con-
straining and even conservative. In the “Theory and Practice” es-
say I describe this tendency in terms of a problematic devaluing of 
practice. Thus, the exculpatory critique can be used to argue that:
any form of art practice that produces some concrete change in 
the world or is developed in alliance with specific social move-
ments (via the creation or preservation of a park, the generation 
of new, prefigurative collective forms, shifts in the disposition 
of power in a given community etc.) is entirely pragmatic and 
has no critical or conceptually creative capacity. Or, alternately, 
that such projects, by suggesting that some meaningful change 
is possible within existing social and political structures, do 
nothing more than forestall the necessary, but inevitably de-
ferred, revolution.
What we lose sight of here is the generative nature of resistance 
itself, at the local or situational level. While Rasmussen makes 
frequent references in his FIELD essay to “real change” it is not en-
tirely clear what he means by this. We can gain a better sense of 
what he might have in mind if we turn to his 2014 essay “Here and 
Elsewhere,” where he is insistent that we must continue to identify 
the “communist project” and “communist revolution” as the only 
possible framework for revolutionary change.10 We might then 
wonder how Rasmussen comes to terms with the almost total ab-
sence of “communism” as a frame of reference for social move-
ments over the past few decades (outside of a small number of cases, 
such as the Naxalites in central India, Nepalese Maoism, Shining 
Path in Peru, etc.). In his account the loss of the redemptive horizon 
82
promised by communism is a result of the deliberate repression of 
communist discourse by bourgeois capitalism, which has active-
ly attacked it and circumvented its spread. There is, revealingly 
enough, no reference in his description to the ways in which actu-
ally existing communism, in its performance as social and political 
system, might have resulted in certain tendencies (the repression 
of dissent, dynastic regimes, one-party rule, Nomenklatura-based 
social and economic hierarchies, etc.) that have contributed to its 
de-legitimation among a more recent generation of activists. These 
can all be ascribed, conveniently enough, to the simple fact that 
those regimes that we typically identify as “communist” or “social-
ist” were, in fact, simply not communist enough, and therefore al-
lowed incipient capitalist tendencies to deform their immanent, 
utopian nature. 
This leads to the one-dimensional form taken by Rasmussen’s 
historical summary: “the Soviet Union was never socialist,” Mao 
Zedong and Ho Chi Minh’s economic policies were “… variants of 
state capitalism,” and the entire Pink Tide period in Latin America 
amounted to nothing more than “state capitalist reforms.” With 
“communism” safely reinvented as a purely metaphysical concept 
(Rasmussen refers to the “elimination of the state” and “money” 
that will accompany a true communist revolution, with no expla-
nation of how a social system responsible for meeting the mate-
rial needs to millions, or billions, of individuals would function 
in the absence of an institutional structure that does not posses 
some state-like qualities).11 While we are entitled to critique “ac-
tually existing capitalism” on the basis of its failures, actually ex-
isting communism, as such, does not really exist in Rasmussen’s 
account. As a result he is under no obligation to ask himself why 
Islamic fundamentalists and populist neo-fascists can recruit with 
alarming ease among the poor and working class, while the glo-
rious cause of a fourth International languishes in obscurity. In 
particular, he seems incapable of realizing that there may be some-
thing in the way in which the communist and socialist left itself has 
communicated its vision, and made it relevant (or not) to people’s 
struggles and lived experience that has retarded its progress. The 
only possible point of revolutionary hope that Rasmussen seems 
willing to recognize is the Arab Spring which he presents, some-
what improbably, as a well-spring of proto-proletarian revolu-
tionary fervor, even as many of the protestors at Tahrir Square, to 
use one example, were primarily concerned with decidedly liber-
al concerns such as governmental corruption, police brutality, free 
speech and democracy.
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It is not that Rasmussen’s judgments do not contain a degree of 
truth (the capitalist attack on communism is a matter of historical re-
cord, many Arab Spring protestors were critical of neo-liberalism, 
and the failings of Chavez et.al. were fairly evident to most observ-
ers). Rather, it is his apparent reluctance to see anything of value in 
the partial forms of revolutionary change that have been achieved, 
whether under communism, socialism or even liberalism, and to 
view social change as a kind of zero sum equation which only mat-
ters if it emerges from a space that is entirely free and autonomous 
from existing political institutions and discourses. One wonders if 
it is possible that some small aspect of any of these past movements 
(the Bolshevik revolution, the Communist revolutions in China or 
Cuba, and even the more recent emergence of anti-globalization 
and “horizontalist” movements in Latin America or Spain) might 
shed some light on our current situation or provide some guidance 
or inspiration? On the one hand we have, in Rasmussen’s account, 
a system of capitalist repression so seamless, so pervasive and so 
monolithic that it can appropriate even the most minor gesture of 
resistance or change, and on the other the insistence that any chal-
lenge to this system must emerge from a political space that is en-
tirely separate from it; that can in no possible way be seen to bear 
the marks of democracy, the state, rights, or any number of other 
concepts that are now to be understood as irrevocably contaminat-
ed by their affiliation with the capitalist juggernaut. 
So, what would “real change” look like for Rasmussen? This is 
not entirely clear in his writings, but if he is to remain consistent 
with the traditions of Communist political theory it would entail 
some sort of cataclysmic revolutionary overturning which com-
pletely transforms the existing (capitalist) social and economic 
order, along with our underlying human nature, which has been 
fundamentally altered by bourgeois modes of possessive indi-
vidualism. In this case, anything short of an absolute destruction 
of the existing order can be dismissed as reformist, complicit or 
counter-revolutionary. Here “revolution” is defined as a form of 
political autopoiesis, inventing itself in its entirety ex nihilo, and 
rendering all existing institutions and political discourses obsolete 
in the process. There is a venerable tradition behind this model, 
but it is not without its limitations. For my part, I believe that po-
litical change always emerges out of a pre-existing set of material, 
discursive, institutional and counter-institutional practices. This 
temporal continuum is paralleled by a spatial continuum, through 
a mode of capillary action that runs from individual conscious-
ness to collective action and violent resistance, and that involves 
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the emergence of new solidarities, and their subsequent dissolu-
tion, moments of provisional consensus, and moments of dissen-
sus. What we call the “Russian Revolution” didn’t begin with Lenin, 
it began with the resistance movements of the nineteenth centu-
ry, with the Kolokol, with the Peasant Movement, with Zemlya I 
Volya, with Young Russia, which led eventually to the February 
revolution which actually deposed the Tsar, which led finally, to 
the Bolshevik takeover (which was less a taking-over than a pick-
ing-up, as Hannah Arendt famously observed). Each of these nodal 
points was decisive in producing the eventual transformation that 
we describe as the Russian Revolution. 
I would argue that in writing about SEA we need a more sophis-
ticated model of political change, which can account for this capil-
lary nature. Any work of art, even the most precious and privatized 
example of art for art’s sake, has an “impact” in the transformation 
of an individual viewer’s consciousness (or the accumulation of in-
vestment value). The challenge is determining how the transfor-
mation of consciousness through the encounter with a work of art 
might effect the viewer’s subsequent actions in the world. This is 
the more interesting question: how do we determine what “change” 
means, what it looks like, and what forms of change are more cre-
ative, more generative or more transformative? Here is one provi-
sional set of categories for understanding this question.
•  Transformations in individual consciousness (which may, or 
may not, lead to a transformation in action or social agency, and 
which may or may not be serially communicated or transmitted 
to others). Evident in a myriad of art forms and practices.
•  Prefigurative modeling (the creation, in various forms of activ-
ist practice, of new modes of social organization that challenge 
existing hierarchies of power, decision-making, creativity and 
so on). Evident in many contemporary art practices that involve 
the invention of new, para-institutional forms. In an essay in 
FIELD issue #1 Francesca Polletta discusses the important 
points of conflict between this prefigurative dimension and the 
exigencies of direct action during the Civil Rights movement.
•  Transformations in cultural or symbolic discourse (the intro-
duction of new value systems, re-framing of debates or the al-
teration of social relationships at a given site). Evident in the 
work of Dialogue in Bastar, India, which I discuss in The One 
and the Many and the Transborder Immigrant Tool (discussed 
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Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) 2.0/b.a.n.g. lab,  
Transborder Immigrant Tool (2007-Present)
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in my essay “Waterworks: Politics, Public Art and the University 
Campus” in the Blackwell Companion to Public Art, 2016).
•  The re-shaping of spatial boundaries, the defensive partition-
ing of space or territory, or the temporary occupation of pub-
lic space. Evident in the anti-gentrification struggles of groups 
like Park Fiction, also discussed in The One and the Many. I 
would also consider the covert street performances of NICA in 
Rangoon, under the military junta, an example of a particular-
ly localized manifestation of this impulse (necessarily so, since 
any anomalous public behavior could lead to arrest)
•  The re-shaping of temporal frames, via the blocking or delay-
ing of repressive action (evident most recently in the initial vic-
tory of the Water Protectors at Standing Rock, in South Dakota, 
strikes, recent forms of “slow activism,” etc.).
•  Transformations in public policy (governing the police, social 
policies, property, housing, corporate conduct, etc.) Evident in 
Wochenklausur’s Boat Talks on Lake Zurich, which I discuss 
in Conversation Pieces, Teddy Cruz’s work around urban zon-
ing policies and recent activism associated with the Black Lives 
Matter movement.
•  Transformations in political regimes, at the local, regional or 
national level (which might call on any number of specific strat-
egies). Evident in the Lava la Bandera project discussed above, 
the January 25 Revolution in Egypt and elsewhere.
Taken in the aggregate these are some of the imperfect, messy, im-
provisational and inevitably compromised modalities by which po-
litical and social change actually occurs. They often coexist within 
a given activist project, and can operate on a continuum with open 
violence and insurrection. The extent to which any project is mean-
ingfully transformative, creative or revolutionary (or has a potential 
to effect events beyond its local context) has to be gauged through 
a detailed, situational analysis of these interactions, among many 
others. They each involve encounters that can provoke new insights 
and new modes of practice and which can, in turn, provide the foun-
dation for subsequent action and insight. In this sense they can be 
simultaneously pragmatic (involving processes of concrete prob-
lem solving), diagnostic (revealing new cognitive and institutional 
blockages and openings) and prefigurative (disclosing new modes 
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of contestation that might be scalable or replicable in the future as 
well as new insights into the process of social change more gener-
ally). The question that Rasmussen raises, of course, is whether all 
of these registers of practice or resistance are simply reiterations 
of the same “modest” problematic, since none of them can be guar-
anteed to lead irrevocably to the total destruction of global capital-
ism and few of them openly espouse the cause of global communist 
revolution which he has identified as the single legitimate telos of 
real political change. 
ŽIŽEK AT THE FINLAND STATION
This question leads us to what I believe is the most generative point 
in our exchange, which revolves around the role of the critic or the-
orist. We can begin this discussion with Rasmussen’s response to 
my treatment of Adorno in the “Theory and Practice” essay. It is 
worth quickly reviewing this reference, since it was offered in pass-
ing to make a broader point. At its founding in 1931, the Frankfurt 
School ethos was defined by a commitment to trans-disciplinary 
research (across the fields of political economy, psychology, so-
ciology and aesthetics) devoted to the critical analysis of capital-
ism (and nascent fascism). This research was to be developed in 
support of the broader mosaic of left-wing and working class po-
litical movements active in Germany at the time. At this stage, as 
we see in Horkheimer’s inaugural address, the domain of “culture” 
(not simply art, but popular and mass culture) was understood as a 
field of quasi-autonomous “social action” with at least the poten-
tial to challenge the economic imperatives of capitalism. By the 
mid-1940s, and the publication of The Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
the Frankfurt School model of critical theory has changed dramat-
ically, and taken on the more elegiac tone we are familiar with from 
art world presentations of Adorno. We have in this book an almost 
entirely monolithic account of the appropriative power of the capi-
talist system that is, moreover, projected back into the earliest stag-
es of human history (through what Adorno and Horkheimer term 
“retrogressive anthropogenesis”). Three conclusions follow from 
this diagnosis:
1. Real or substantive political change is now impossible due to 
the consolidation of “state capitalism,” which is the institution-
al form taken by instrumental reason.
2. Culture in general has become entirely coopted by a “totally ad-
ministered society.” As a result, the only space within existing 
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society where an authentic revolutionary impulse might be pre-
served is in certain very specific forms of avant-garde art and 
(aesthetic) theory. The sanctity of this revolutionary truth can 
be maintained only so long as avant-garde art and theory re-
main entirely disconnected from practical experience and ac-
tion. Here the artist becomes a “deputy,” as Adorno writes, on 
behalf of an ideologically subservient working class no longer 
able to realize its historical destiny.12
3. As a result there is no point in either engaging in forms of prac-
tical resistance, or of investigating the possible connection be-
tween art, theory and social change. First, because the social 
science methodologies necessary to conduct this research are, 
themselves, merely extensions of instrumental reason, and sec-
ond, because any attempt to actualize the insights of theory in 
practice, or to establish a reciprocal interconnection between 
theory and practice will, inevitably, lead to the cooption and 
degradation of theory’s revolutionary purity.
For Adorno it is precisely in the sequestered, “inward” conscious-
ness of the theorist or artist that a pure form of revolutionary 
thought can be preserved. As a result theory, like art, must remain 
aloof and disengaged from questions of practice, application or 
positive action. Adorno treats both theory and practice as fixed 
constructs, and their reciprocal engagement (or lack thereof) as 
occurring in an oddly a-temporal field. The result is an absolutist 
model of theoretical and aesthetic autonomy that fails to account 
for the ways in which theory might bear a shifting relationship to 
practice over time, moving from a phase of immersive or direct en-
gagement to a phase of contemplative reflection and back again 
(one should note here that Marcuse’s critique of the “dual nature” 
of art can be applied with equal relevance to the discourse of theo-
ry). How, in fact, does one determine when the historical moment 
has arrived that might allow for the re-actualization of theoretical 
truth without some way of analyzing unfolding forms of political 
action? Theoretical truth, like aesthetic experience, is not meant to 
be tested by practical experience, nor does it evolve out of a dia-
logical relationship with practice. Instead, the telos of social or po-
litical transformation is already known by the theorist in advance 
and practice is reduced to the merely utilitarian application of an 
a priori theoretical “truth” necessary to produce this end. Thus, 
while Adorno challenged conventional notions of the aesthetic 
based on the transcendent experience of beauty he reproduced the 
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underlying schema of aesthetic autonomy. This schema is predi-
cated on a fixed boundary between the profane social world and 
the redemptive interiority of individual consciousness; the site at 
which all meaningful insight generation occurs (to be subsequently 
applied to practical, collective action in that world). 
Given Adorno’s experience of fascism and the rise of consumer 
capitalism in the post-WWII period his pessimism is entirely under-
standable. The question we face today is whether or not the abso-
lute detachment of critical theory from practice (and of art itself 
from political and social change) that, for Adorno, followed natu-
rally from his melancholic assessment of the political situation is 
still useful or empowering. In fact, it is around this question of the-
ory, practice and the potential for social change that Adorno’s fall-
ing out with Herbert Marcuse occurred in 1969 (as documented in 
their letter exchange re-published in FIELD Issue 5). In January of 
that year Adorno had called in the police to break up an occupation 
of the Frankfurt Institute offices by student protestors associat-
ed with the Außerparlamentarische Opposition or APO. Marcuse, 
learning of Adorno’s actions, wrote him to express his disagree-
ment, and his support of the student activists. Adorno, for his part, 
dismissed the protestors as opportunistic and politically naïve. The 
decisive exchange circulates around the relationship between theo-
ry and practice. Marcuse writes:
I would have left them [the protestors] sitting there and left it to 
somebody else to call the police. I still believe that our cause … 
is better taken up by the rebellious students than by the police 
and, here in California, that is demonstrated to me almost dai-
ly… You know me well enough to know that I reject the unmedi-
ated translation of theory into praxis just as emphatically as you 
do. But I do believe that there are situations, moments, in which 
theory is pushed on further by praxis—situations and moments 
in which theory that is kept separate from praxis becomes un-
true to itself.
Adorno’s response is symptomatic: 
You think that praxis … is not blocked today; I think differently. 
I would have to deny everything that I think and know about the 
objective tendency if I wanted to believe that the student protest 
movement in Germany had even the tiniest prospect of effect-
ing a social intervention … I would … concede to you that there 
are moments in which theory is pushed on further by practice. 
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But such a situation neither exists objectively today, nor does 
the barren and brutal practicism that confronts us here have the 
slightest thing to do with theory anyhow.13
In an analysis that prefigures in many ways Rasmussen’s critique of 
“modest gestures,” Adorno attacked the APO activists on the basis 
of their reliance on “action-ism,” or the naïve belief that “if only 
you change little things here and there, then perhaps everything 
will be better.” “Action-ism can essentially be traced back to de-
spair,” as Adorno observes, “because people sense how little pow-
er they actually have to change society. But I am equally convinced 
that these individual actions are predestined to fail.”14 
Rasmussen, like Adorno, views the avant-garde as a unique ves-
sel of revolutionary truth. Thus he links the “disappearance of the 
avant-garde” in the past few decades directly to the “disappear-
ance of a revolutionary perspective and the closing down of a rad-
ical horizon.”15 He also believes that avant-garde tactics of shock 
or disruption constitute a kind of somatically displaced form of 
revolutionary assault, necessary to “wrest humanity free from the 
instrumental rationality of bourgeois society and supercede the al-
ienating relations of capitalism.”16 But does Rasmussen also share 
Adorno’s view of the impossibility of meaningful social change? 
Rather than address the more systemic questions raised in my essay 
around the nature of political change, Rasmussen instead reviews 
the litany of failures associated with the repression of communism 
during the twentieth century. 
Kester does not deal with the historical development from the 
revolutionary take off in the years between 1917 to 1923: the pre-
ventive (Italian Fascism) and the ‘finishing’ (German Nazism) 
counter-revolutionary derailment of the revolutionary offen-
sive in Western Europe, the state-capitalist counterrevolution 
in the Soviet Union, to the economic crisis and the anti-Fascist 
fight, World War Two and “the massacres of the slaves of cap-
ital,” as Amadeo Bordiga calls it, as well as the reconstruction 
of the apparatus of production in Western Europe after the end 
of the war, which resulted in high profit rates and the narrowing 
of the political horizon within the framework of the Cold War.
I suspect that this historical summary is meant as a corrective to 
what Rasmussen imagines is my overly optimistic or naïve view 
of the possibilities of meaningful political change today. At the 
same time, it can easily enough be taken as verification of Adorno’s 
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pessimistic assessment that “no real change is possible.” He then 
goes on to link my ostensible ignorance of this history with the 
transgressive goals of Adorno’s critical theory.
But Kester’s analysis moves quickly and disregards the substan-
tive historical transformations taking place during these dec-
ades. This is a process in which the Western European working 
class movement inscribed itself in nation-state democracy, 
abandoning [the] last gasp of revolutionary demands for po-
litical rights and access to commodities and welfare. Critical 
Theory was actually trying to analyze this development (as were 
the Situationists and, later, Cultural Studies) in which working 
class identity and culture were gradually dissolved and replaced 
by new image-driven subjectivities devoid of political agency. 
To analyze this development as a question of abandoning em-
pirical analysis is simply inadequate… 
Adorno and Horkheimer still had an idea of an historical sub-
ject that had, no doubt, acquired a ghostly form in what Adorno 
describes as “the classless class society”. But the task was to 
analyze that development. For Kester, this does not seem to be 
necessary; there is no such subject or even an idea of such a sub-
ject. There is just this world that socially engaged art can re-
pair and ameliorate, which the socially engaged art critic can, 
then, describe. 
Here Rasmussen collapses together a range of different intellectual 
traditions that have clearly incompatible perceptions of the efficacy 
of social and political change. Adorno, especially the later Adorno 
I reference in my essay, would have absolutely no patience for the 
kinds of reception studies and sociological research that were typ-
ical of the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies (e.g., Richard 
Hoggart’s Uses of Literacy) not to mention Raymond William’s re-
demptive concept of “culture” (Williams certainly would disagree 
that the working class was entirely “devoid of political agency”). 
Moreover, Adorno would have found the Situationists just as prob-
lematic as most other “new” art practices of the 1960s, which he 
dismisses in Aesthetic Theory as guilty of actionism and dedicat-
ed to the absolute destruction of art: “To call for the abolition 
of art in a society that is moving from partial to total barbarism 
is to invite co-optation by that society. The recent aesthetic ac-
tivism keeps invoking concreteness but is woefully abstract and 
summary in its approach.”17 In 1964 Adorno even instituted legal 
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proceedings against members of Subversive Aktion, a Situationist-
inspired group that had posted “wanted” posters featuring Adorno 
quotes around the University of Frankfurt campus. For their part, 
the Situationists would have no doubt considered Cultural Studies 
theorists, who imagined that they could observe the “resistant” 
consumption of mass culture by a working class enmeshed in the 
Society of the Spectacle, as hopelessly naïve in turn.
In fact, “Critical Theory,” as I use the term in the essay that 
Rasmussen cites, was precisely not interested in analyzing the 
evolution of capitalism. That work had already been done (via 
Adorno’s reliance on a functionalist merger of Frommian psychol-
ogy and Friedrich Pollocks’ analysis of “state capitalism” in the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment). Capitalism was, and remained, the 
straightforward extension of the relentless evolution of human 
consciousness towards total instrumentality. One could certainly 
spend a great deal of time pointing out the endless ways in which 
this instrumental reason continued to colonize the most intimate 
spaces of our public and private lives (even “casement windows,” 
for Adorno are harbingers of capitalist oppression), but that’s not 
the same thing as analyzing a “development” (which implies the 
possibility of change or historical movement that Adorno felt was 
foreclosed).18 That image, of a monolithic and implacable system 
of domination, and the impossibility of real resistance to it, is cen-
tered on a concept of fundamental stasis. 
The crucial point that I raise in my essay “Theory and Practice” 
has nothing to do with my assessment of the relative efficacy of 
revolutionary struggle in the twentieth century. Rather, my inten-
tion was to challenge Adorno’s assumption, disabling for us today, 
that the past failures of revolution mean that there is simply no 
longer any point in trying to learn about, and from, resistance to-
day. And that “theory” or art must abjure any reciprocal relation-
ship to practices of political resistance. And, finally, that the only 
space in which a “true” revolutionary knowledge can be maintained 
is the detached consciousness of the theorist or artist. Rasmussen is 
silent on these issues. Why does the historical fact of political fail-
ure necessarily lead us to believe that theory must be uncoupled 
entirely from practice? In Adorno’s case the justification was clear; 
the existing system of domination was so implacable that revolu-
tionary truth had to be hidden away, like a precious talisman, to 
be preserved for a future moment, when “objective” change was 
finally possible again. If all real change is impossible and if the 
theorist always/already knows in advance what real change looks 
like, there is no need to actually research social resistance here and 
Grant Kester
93 The Limitations of the Exculpatory Critique: A Response to Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen
now because the theorist has already grasped its utter futility. Does 
Rasmussen share this view? His often-schematic account of polit-
ical history would suggest that he is sympathetic to it. At the very 
least it remains a significant point of tension in his analysis.
If we were to encapsulate the rhetorical essence of Rasmussen’s 
position in his essay it might sound something like this: “If I am 
not vigilant, certain SEA projects that are, in fact, complicit with 
a repressive capitalist system might be given unearned political 
credibility. My primary job, as a theorist and critic, is to under-
mine the legitimacy of these projects, thereby robbing the capitalist 
system of the ideological validation that they provide.” The critic 
here plays a fundamentally prophylactic role, searching out hidden 
complicities, exposing unrecognized levels of compromise, and 
preventing the premature reconciliation of communism as meta-
physical ideal and the inevitable reformism of practice. Rasmussen 
himself provides some support for this characterization in a recent 
interview in which he states:
I do not present any program to be realized anywhere. As a 
white, heterosexual, middle-class male it is not up to me to draw 
up any visions in the current historical situation. Rather, it is my 
task to help abolish all the models created by the Western en-
lightenment project: models that prevent others from being vi-
sionary. So yes, my project is negative in nature. It would be a 
great help to the processes that are now underway if we could 
effect a meltdown of all the passed-down notions about growth, 
market, national democracy, and state. That would almost be 
half a revolution in its own right.19
We have to first note the characteristically monolithic image of the 
“Western enlightenment project” in Rasmussen’s response, which 
leaves us little hope for any possible improvement in our political 
condition short of a cataclysmic overturning of this entire edifice of 
domination. One also feels compelled to note the simple fact that 
“communism” itself is clearly a product of Enlightenment think-
ing, broadly understood (the influence of Comte and Rousseau on 
Russian political discourse is a commonplace), and bears those 
traces at many levels. Rasmussen envisions the audience for his 
gesture of pure negation to consist of those ”others” whose task is 
”being visionary,” but who are currently impeded in this task by 
their reliance on problematic political beliefs which he will dedi-
cate himself to clarifying. He seeks to function here something like 
Žižek at Zucotti Park; the radical thinker edifying the social agents 
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Slavoj Žižek at Zuccotti Park (October 9, 2011)
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charged with the physical and social labor of political transforma-
tion (”Don’t fall in love with yourselves. We have a nice time here. 
But remember, carnivals come cheap.”). 
In the quote above Rasmussen appears to re-frame Adorno’s 
theory/practice division as a division between the principle of pure 
negation (represented by himself as critic and theorist) and the 
“positive” moment of social change, which he will supervise not 
by dictating models but simply by determining which versions of 
social change are sufficiently revolutionary to meet his stringent 
criteria. The world of “visionary” action is defined as a field of 
potential error to be corrected, not lessons to be learned, and the 
theorist retains his sovereignty and his intellectual authority by re-
stricting himself to the purely negative labor of critique produced in 
isolation from political praxis. I am not arguing that, as critics, we 
should surrender our skepticism or our willingness to situate spe-
cific practices in a larger political context, but I do think we have 
to consider the possibility that our own a priori assumptions about 
the nature of political change and revolution might need to be re-
vised in the light of new, unfolding forms of resistance and activist 
practice today. And this requires, in turn, challenging to some de-
gree the monological authority of theory and criticism itself. In this 
respect, the critic and theorist must also possess some visionary 
awareness; some capacity to see beyond the often simplistic bina-
ry oppositions between pure negation and positive action, between 
revolution and reform, between contemplative analysis and the act 
of resistance, and between theory and practice, that we can impose 
on the creative work of political change. It goes without saying that 
we should criticize those SEA projects that are complicit or depolit-
icized (there are certainly enough of them). But to present this state 
of complicity as the necessary and generic condition of any SEA 
project that produces concrete change, or that operates “modestly” 
in a local or situational context is, to me, to risk blindness to the 
very generative processes of resistance specific to our time, out of 
which new configurations of the political will, and must, evolve. 
Ultimately this is not an argument that can be won or lost logical-
ly; it is more a reflection of a Weltbild or style of thought. My hope 
in the redemptive potential of praxis to reveal new configurations 
of the political is no less utopian than Rasmussen’s belief that the 
largely middle class protestors of Tahrir Square were the advance 
guard of an incipient “communist revolution”. Having said that, I 
am very sympathetic to Rasmussen’s frustration with the failure of 
the communist project, and his desire to hold the line against its 
further erosion by an act of intellectual will. These are certainly 
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difficult times to live in for anyone who holds out hope for some 
form of social and political redemption and our only path forward 
requires precisely the kind of dialogue that Rasmussen has initi-
ated here, as we think through the nature of resistance together. 
Rasmussen has raised a number of essential questions, and while 
I might disagree with aspects of his analysis, I share his concern 
with the many compromises imposed by capitalism on the human 
desire for a society based on freedom and equality, and value the 
opportunity that our exchange has provided to explore these ques-
tions more deeply.
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NOTES
1 Alice Jardine and Brian Massumi, “Interview with Toni 
Negri,” Copyright #1 (1988): 74-75.
2 I will address one other minor point in this note. I believe 
I understand what Rasmussen means by the “formal” 
aspects of a work, but I may also be misunderstanding 
him. If by “formal” he is referring to the compositional 
manipulation of a set of abstract visual or physical 
properties within a closed, purely self-referential 
system, then I would probably agree with him. However, 
I would also argue that there is a highly complex formal 
or “architectonic” (to use Bakhtin’s term) system at 
work in many of the SEA projects I have discussed in my 
own research. It is structured through somatic, social, 
physical and verbal interaction that is inter-subjective 
and also directed at specific institutional and discursive 
structures, associated with processes of resistance. I 
do not believe I have ever stated that the critic’s job is to 
simply “report with empathy.” Here I think Rasmussen 
may be confusing the role of empathy as it is negotiated 
within a particular work, and the critic’s relationship to a 
given project. While I do think that part of the evaluative 
process of certain forms of SEA requires an analysis 
of the various modes of intersubjective exchange 
that unfold in a given work, I would be cautious about 
reducing the role of the critic to simply experiencing 
“empathy,” and this seems at odds with my own 
approach.
3 See Gustavo Buntinx, “Lava la bandera: el Colectivo 
Sociedad Civil y el derrocamiento cultural de la 
dictadura en el Perú,” E-misférica journal 3.1 (June 
2006) http://hemisphericinstitute.org/journal/3.1/eng/
en31_pg_buntinx.html
4 For more information on the Escraches see: http://
www.hijos-capital.org.ar/index.php?option=com_
content&view=section&layout=blog&id=7&Itemid=407
5 Here I will list Rasmussen’s original passage, followed by 
my response.
 “The critic is supposed to go where the projects go, 
observing them as they unfold over time. Kester writes 
that the critic must “empirically” “verify” the artistic 
projects and their “results” although how that is to 
take place remains unclear. Instead of continuing 
the critical analysis of the anthropological turn of 
politicized contemporary art, Kester proposes to expand 
it and apply it to art criticism, without mentioning the 
widespread critique of the ethnographic practice of 
field study that has taken place over the last thirty 
years . . . And this does not even mention the imperialist 
prehistory of ethnography that has always haunted 
anthropology and forced it to challenge the idea of an 
outside, scientific researcher who uses neutral language 
to analyze the ‘raw’ material gathered. . .”
 I am not unfamiliar with critiques of anthropology or 
ethnography. If I were invoking ethnography as it was 
practiced two or three decades ago as a model I might 
find this critique more compelling. In fact, contemporary 
anthropology presents a range of useful paradigms, 
from the tradition of collaborative ethnography 
involving a process of “co-theorization” with social 
movements (especially well developed in Colombia) to 
George Marcus’s “multi-sited” ethnography (Marcus 
is also a FIELD editorial board member whose work 
we have published), to recent projects by Shannon 
Speed working in Chiapas, or Alex Flynn’s work with the 
Landless Workers Movement in Latin America, among 
many others. None of these approaches treat the site 
of research from the perspective of naïve empiricism 
and all are fully cognizant of the problematic colonialist 
histories of the discipline that Rasmussen seems to 
imagine as a kind of scandalous secret. What interests 
me about this criticism is less its cogency than its 
symptomatic nature. Art theorists frequently employ 
ideas drawn from an array of other disciplines without 
feeling compelled to repeatedly “reveal” the surprising 
truth that these disciplines have problematic histories or 
that they have evolved over time. The skeptical response 
some art critics have to the disciplines of ethnography or 
anthropology seems to be tied to an almost instinctual 
resistance to direct, observational or participatory 
engagement with practice. 
 One wonders what possible threat might it pose to 
our own theoretical equanimity to speak directly with 
the participants, collaborators or other social actors 
involved in the creation of a given work or to analyze the 
process of cultural or political resistance or creativity 
that unfolds at a specific site? Adorno, of course, was 
highly critical of any attempt to develop an analytic 
account of the actual reception of music (he singled out 
German sociologist Alphonse Silbermann in particular 
for attack), which would have the effect of confirming, 
or challenging, his own often hyperbolic theories about 
how people react to specific musical forms. This was 
because, first, he viewed all forms of social science 
as little more than the handmaidens of instrumental 
reason (notwithstanding his own reliance on sociological 
research in The Authoritarian Personality) and second, 
because he felt that art, and his own description of how 
art might transform the viewer’s consciousness, was 
never really intended to describe the experience of 
actual viewers, but was intended instead to evoke an 
ideal or hypothetical viewer yet-to-be. There were many 
reasons for this belief, but suffice it to say that I find 
this to be an unsatisfying theoretical framework for the 
analysis of SEA projects that do not treat the viewer or 
collaborator as a surrogate for a generic bourgeoisie 
subject. Having said that, FIELD has clearly not yet 
done enough to elaborate more fully on the points of 
productive overlap between anthropological and art 
historical research, and we plan to focus on this question 
more fully in future issues.
•  “Social movements do not figure in Kester’s discussion 
of the socially engaged art critic: there is no Occupy, 
no Black Lives Movement”. A detailed response to 
this question would require some discussion of what 
we each mean by the term “social movemen.t” I offer 
the examples below simply by way of clarification. In 
the course of its first five issues FIELD published two 
lengthy essays on Occupy Wall Street (OWS), an essay 
by Christoph Schäffer that addresses the occupation of 
Gezi Park in Istanbul, an essay by sociologist Francesca 
Polletta that examines the relationship between race 
and participatory democracy in the U.S. Civil Rights 
movement, and a letter exchange between T.W. Adorno 
and Herbert Marcuse discussing their respective 
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perceptions of the student movements of the 1960s in 
Germany and the U.S. We have essays forthcoming on 
the role of the Sem Terra movement in Brazil, and an 
overview of Latin American activist art that relates this 
practice to social movements in the global south. We are 
also in the early planning stages for a special issue on 
race and incarceration. OWS and Black Lives Movement 
(BLM), of course, didn’t exist when I was writing 
Conversation Pieces (University of California Press, 
2004) and The One and the Many (Duke University Press, 
2011). However, in both books I do discuss a range of 
other social movements, including the labor movement 
in the US/Mexico border region, protests against police 
violence in Oakland, California, the anti-gentrification 
movement in Hamburg, Germany, etc. 
6 This criticism mirrors an analysis developed by the BAVO 
Collective almost ten years ago in “Always Choose the 
Worst Option: Artistic Resistance and the Strategy of 
Over-Identification,” BAVO Collective (June 26, 2008), 
24, 20. Available at: http://www.bavo.biz/texts/view/45. 
BAVO consists of Gideon Boie and Matthias Pauwels, 
working out of Rotterdam and Brussels. I respond to this 
criticism in The One and the Many, 223-226.
7 In both Conversation Pieces and The One and the 
Many I examine the ways in which SEA projects can 
be appropriated by various state and private entities 
in some detail (in my discussions of Dawn Dedeaux’s 
Soul Shadows, Suzanne Lacy’s The Roof is on Fire, Rick 
Lowe’s Project Row Houses and Park Fiction, among 
several other examples). FIELD has also focused on this 
question. We have published a two-part critical essay on 
the discourse of participatory design by C. Greig Crysler 
as well as an essay by Caroline Lee, a leading sociologist 
who researches the ways in which concepts of political 
“participation” have been bureaucratized in the U.S. 
8 In this respect, Marcuse’s treatment of the avant-garde 
as a component of “controlled desublimation” in One 
Dimensional Man (written almost thirty years after the 
“Affirmative Character of Culture”) might be a more 
useful frame of reference for current debates.
9 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, edited by Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, translated by C. Lenhardt 
(London: Routledge, 1984), 193.
10 See “Here and Elsewhere” on Open! Platform for Art, 
Culture and the Public Domain (September 4, 2014). 
https://www.onlineopen.org/here-and-elsewhere, p.1. 
In this essay Rasmussen identifies Occupy Wall Street 
as “the first nationwide protest movement in the U.S. 
since the late 1960s.” This claim, however, ignores a 
number of significant precedents. One would certainly 
want to include on this list the anti-nuclear movement, 
which generated national support throughout the 1970s 
and ‘80s, nation-wide protests during the Reagan 
administration against U.S. involvement in Central 
America, protests and demonstrations attacking U.S. 
policies on AIDS and HIV during the late 1980s and 
1990s, Jesse Jackson’s National Rainbow Coalition, 
which had branches throughout the U.S. during the 
1980s and early 1990s, the Million Man March initiated 
by Louis Farrakhan in the mid-1990s, and ongoing 
mobilization by the feminist and environmentalist 
movements during the past four decades.
11 Ibid., 5. One is reminded here of Friedrich Engels’ 
sarcastic summation of Bakunin’s anarchism: “authority 
= state = absolute evil.” “In this society [the Bakuninist 
ideal future society] there will above all be no authority, 
for authority = state = absolute evil. (How these people 
propose to run a factory, operate a railway or steer 
a ship without a will that decides in the last resort, 
without a single management, they of course do not 
tell us). The authority of the majority over the minority 
also ceases. Every individual and every community is 
autonomous; but as to how a society of even only two 
people is possible unless each gives up some of his 
autonomy, Bakunin again maintains silence.” Friedrich 
Engels letter to Theodor Cuno (January 24, 1872), 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1872/
letters/72_01_24.htm.
12 Theodor Adorno, “The Artist as Deputy,” Notes to 
Literature, volume one, translated by Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 
67.
13 The translated version of Adorno and Marcuse’s letters 
first appeared in New Left Review I/233 (January-
February 1999): 123-136. The quotes above are from 
pp.125, 127. 
14 Gerhard Richter, “Who’s Afraid of the Ivory Tower? A 
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